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Abstract 
Fresh water is a critical resource for human survival. However, conflicting demands and 
threats on fresh water supplies constantly arise, jeopardizing the sustainability of these 
resources. Decisions made today regarding water resources have an impact not only on 
current water usage, but also on that of years to come. Thus, both surface and groundwater 
resources should be managed with sensitivity to present needs, as well as consideration for 
future threats. The risks concerning water resources are either natural risks that may be 
difficult or impossible to be controlled and prevented, or risks resulted from human actions. 
 
The risk management method is most commonly used in the planning and developing 
phases of complex industrialized projects. The current paper demonstrates that this 
methodology is applicable with some modifications to help manage projects, organizations, 
and even monetary risks of water resources. Traditionally, risk events are measured by two 
main criteria: impact and probability of occurrence. However, some of the risks associated with 
water resource management may contain high expected costs and be beyond the control of 
human society. Therefore, an additional criterion is proposed for the assessment of risks – 
the controllability. The introduction of this criterion adds a third dimension to the risk 
evaluation process. 
 
To explore the applicability of the risk management methodology and its modification, it is 
applied to the risk management of water resources in Israel. For this specific empirical 
setting, the addition of the controllability criterion alters the order of severity of some of the 
perceived risks. 
Keywords: Risk management, Water resources, Risk controllability 
 
1. Introduction 
Fresh water resources are critical for human survival. Without them, human society would 
be unable to prosper or even exist. The ever-growing conflicting demands for fresh water 
supplies threaten the sustainability of this essential resource. Decreasing usable water 
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supplies, coupled with rapid increases in demand and poor management, have led to the 
inefficient and unsustainable use of water resources with significant economic, social, and 
environmental ramifications. The failure to meet basic human and environmental needs for 
water has given rise to increasing tensions over access to water. Many believe that the 
competition over scarce water resources, which regularly occurs at local, regional, and 
international scales, will increase tensions and possibly cause armed conflicts between states 
and sectors (see for example Clarke 1991; Gleick 1993; 2000; Postel 1997; Duba and El-Ashry 
2000). 
 
In the current work, the use of risk management methodology is suggested to increase the 
flexibility and security of agreements over the management of water resources. This 
methodology has a long history of experience in the field of project management. It has its 
roots in the understanding that risk events without preplanned responses have the potential 
to cause irreversible damage to projects. The experience, gained through managing risks 
related to commercial projects, has greatly contributed to the applicability of risk 
management theory. Therefore, it is an adequate tool, which can help improve water 
resource management by mitigating risks involved in its maintenance and utilization. 
 
In this paper, the risk management methodology is adopted to increase flexibility, which is 
necessary for the efficient management of water resources. Since the nature of this resource 
predetermines that many of the risks associated with it are not easily controlled, we suggest 
a modification of the standard risk management methodology by accounting for an inability 
to control a given risk at an early planning stage. Thus, the controllability of the risk is 
incorporated among the risk identification parameters, in order to avoid dealing with 
natural risks that are a priori impossible to control. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses some aspects and considerations 
associated with managing a water resource, the natural and social constraints that may 
affect both the risks associated with the resource and the possible treatments for these risks. 
Chapter 3 presents some basics of the risk management methodology, and introduces the 
concept of risk controllability, which is important for addressing risks in an efficient 
manner. In Chapter 4, an empirical study of risk analysis is carried out regarding Israeli 
water resources, followed by Chapter 5’s concluding remarks. 
 
2. Water resource management 
Water resource management can be broadly defined by two large and, at times, conflicting, 
systems: the natural ecological system and the human societies that rely upon the water resources 
for their livelihood. The literature related to water management has, thus, been greatly 
influenced by disciplinary addresses from the fields of hydrology, and engineering via 
scientific research and social science, all of which indicate the increasing recognition of the 
interdisciplinary nature involved in the management of any water resource. This leads to 
the recognition that the risks involved in the maintenance of water systems also involve not 
only the natural risks associated with these resources, but also risks associated with the 
ways in which societies utilize the water, as well as the values with which humans attribute 
to it. Therefore, before discussing the specific risks of any given water resource, 
stakeholders’ consideration, the system’s constraints, and environmental issues in the water 
arena should first be introduced. In this chapter, these issues are discussed in some detail. 
 
2.1 Natural considerations 
Water is perceived as the basis of all life. Civilizations, from ancient times up to the present, 
have maintained complex relationships with water. Balancing often contradicting needs to 
supply for soil cultivation, natural habitats, and industrial and human needs; the approach 
to water resource management alternates between the materialized approach of 
industrialized societies, which perceives water largely as another raw material input for 
commodity production in agriculture and industry, to the idyllic conceptualization of water 
as a sacred source of life, thus maintaining its nonuse value. 
 
From the natural system perspective, water plays an ecological role, as it flows across land, 
from the land into the sea, from the sea into the atmosphere, and from the atmosphere back 
to the land. Management that focuses on water merely as a resource to be tapped and 
distributed has harmful effects on its conflicting uses in the hydrological cycle and the 
replenishment of watersheds. On the other hand, a water resource management perspective 
that views water as a resource to be consumed, rather than a natural flow in the water cycle, 
generates the misconception that water resources can be continually augmented through 
large man-made structures. 
 
The ecological understanding of water involves two factors: firstly, an understanding of the 
relationship between water and other elements in the ecosystem; and secondly, an 
understanding of the limits of water use, which must be enforced by the preservation of the 
water cycle. A mare bias that favors water development fails to perceive the natural river 
flows as being critical for drainage purposes, recharging of groundwater, and maintaining 
the balance between fresh water and seawater. 
 
The impounding of water in large dams leads to deforestation in the catchment areas, 
changes in the micro-climate, as well as soil erosion, thus decreasing the availability of 
water, and in some cases leading to floods. The transport of large volumes of water over 
long distances for agricultural and household use results in water wastage through seepage. 
The introduction of large volumes of water beyond the natural drainage capacity of the 
ecosystem disrupts the hydrological cycle and results in water logging and salinity. 
 
2.2 Social constraints 
The natural perspective is only one side of water resource management. The other side is the 
perspective of the human society that utilizes the resource for its livelihood. Considering the 
social values, beliefs and arrangements involved in the utilization of any fresh water 
resource significantly expands potential adaptation strategies with implications for meeting 
agreed-upon future goals. Many adaptation challenges are due to social constraints, and are 
restricted to the social ability to employ different means of adaptation over time, at different 
stages of conflicts, and in response to different perceptions of what constitutes the 
challenges that must be met. 
 
www.intechopen.com
Risk Management of Water Resources in a Changing Climate 201
supplies, coupled with rapid increases in demand and poor management, have led to the 
inefficient and unsustainable use of water resources with significant economic, social, and 
environmental ramifications. The failure to meet basic human and environmental needs for 
water has given rise to increasing tensions over access to water. Many believe that the 
competition over scarce water resources, which regularly occurs at local, regional, and 
international scales, will increase tensions and possibly cause armed conflicts between states 
and sectors (see for example Clarke 1991; Gleick 1993; 2000; Postel 1997; Duba and El-Ashry 
2000). 
 
In the current work, the use of risk management methodology is suggested to increase the 
flexibility and security of agreements over the management of water resources. This 
methodology has a long history of experience in the field of project management. It has its 
roots in the understanding that risk events without preplanned responses have the potential 
to cause irreversible damage to projects. The experience, gained through managing risks 
related to commercial projects, has greatly contributed to the applicability of risk 
management theory. Therefore, it is an adequate tool, which can help improve water 
resource management by mitigating risks involved in its maintenance and utilization. 
 
In this paper, the risk management methodology is adopted to increase flexibility, which is 
necessary for the efficient management of water resources. Since the nature of this resource 
predetermines that many of the risks associated with it are not easily controlled, we suggest 
a modification of the standard risk management methodology by accounting for an inability 
to control a given risk at an early planning stage. Thus, the controllability of the risk is 
incorporated among the risk identification parameters, in order to avoid dealing with 
natural risks that are a priori impossible to control. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses some aspects and considerations 
associated with managing a water resource, the natural and social constraints that may 
affect both the risks associated with the resource and the possible treatments for these risks. 
Chapter 3 presents some basics of the risk management methodology, and introduces the 
concept of risk controllability, which is important for addressing risks in an efficient 
manner. In Chapter 4, an empirical study of risk analysis is carried out regarding Israeli 
water resources, followed by Chapter 5’s concluding remarks. 
 
2. Water resource management 
Water resource management can be broadly defined by two large and, at times, conflicting, 
systems: the natural ecological system and the human societies that rely upon the water resources 
for their livelihood. The literature related to water management has, thus, been greatly 
influenced by disciplinary addresses from the fields of hydrology, and engineering via 
scientific research and social science, all of which indicate the increasing recognition of the 
interdisciplinary nature involved in the management of any water resource. This leads to 
the recognition that the risks involved in the maintenance of water systems also involve not 
only the natural risks associated with these resources, but also risks associated with the 
ways in which societies utilize the water, as well as the values with which humans attribute 
to it. Therefore, before discussing the specific risks of any given water resource, 
stakeholders’ consideration, the system’s constraints, and environmental issues in the water 
arena should first be introduced. In this chapter, these issues are discussed in some detail. 
 
2.1 Natural considerations 
Water is perceived as the basis of all life. Civilizations, from ancient times up to the present, 
have maintained complex relationships with water. Balancing often contradicting needs to 
supply for soil cultivation, natural habitats, and industrial and human needs; the approach 
to water resource management alternates between the materialized approach of 
industrialized societies, which perceives water largely as another raw material input for 
commodity production in agriculture and industry, to the idyllic conceptualization of water 
as a sacred source of life, thus maintaining its nonuse value. 
 
From the natural system perspective, water plays an ecological role, as it flows across land, 
from the land into the sea, from the sea into the atmosphere, and from the atmosphere back 
to the land. Management that focuses on water merely as a resource to be tapped and 
distributed has harmful effects on its conflicting uses in the hydrological cycle and the 
replenishment of watersheds. On the other hand, a water resource management perspective 
that views water as a resource to be consumed, rather than a natural flow in the water cycle, 
generates the misconception that water resources can be continually augmented through 
large man-made structures. 
 
The ecological understanding of water involves two factors: firstly, an understanding of the 
relationship between water and other elements in the ecosystem; and secondly, an 
understanding of the limits of water use, which must be enforced by the preservation of the 
water cycle. A mare bias that favors water development fails to perceive the natural river 
flows as being critical for drainage purposes, recharging of groundwater, and maintaining 
the balance between fresh water and seawater. 
 
The impounding of water in large dams leads to deforestation in the catchment areas, 
changes in the micro-climate, as well as soil erosion, thus decreasing the availability of 
water, and in some cases leading to floods. The transport of large volumes of water over 
long distances for agricultural and household use results in water wastage through seepage. 
The introduction of large volumes of water beyond the natural drainage capacity of the 
ecosystem disrupts the hydrological cycle and results in water logging and salinity. 
 
2.2 Social constraints 
The natural perspective is only one side of water resource management. The other side is the 
perspective of the human society that utilizes the resource for its livelihood. Considering the 
social values, beliefs and arrangements involved in the utilization of any fresh water 
resource significantly expands potential adaptation strategies with implications for meeting 
agreed-upon future goals. Many adaptation challenges are due to social constraints, and are 
restricted to the social ability to employ different means of adaptation over time, at different 
stages of conflicts, and in response to different perceptions of what constitutes the 
challenges that must be met. 
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Viewed from this perspective, the evolution of water management practices involves 
responding to social conflicts over perceived risks by identifying bottlenecks, and finding 
appropriate tools to meet the challenges posed. As policy makers seek different adaptation 
strategies, they often experience a perceived scarcity in the social means required to initiate 
policies for watershed management. Social tools are needed, so that the necessary policies 
required to control water crises are transformed into a driving force that can actively initiate 
changes in social perspective and power distribution. Managing this process involves 
learning how to deal with different types of conflicts - conflicts encountered as a result of the 
natural resource scarcity itself, as well as conflicts encountered as a result of inadequate 
strategies adopted to treat water demands and needs. 
 
However, the social perspective is not only about the needs related to the water resource. It 
is also the perspective of social power related to the utilization of such a resource. Social 
frictions over resource scarcity impede the supply of social ingenuity, particularly as regards 
the formation of new and reformed institutions, and contribute to the formation of social 
coalitions that oppose change (Homer-Dixon, 1995 and Olson, 1982). These coalitions often 
operate across multiple scales and may disrupt cooperation solutions for the 
commonwealth, as they pursue their own self interests. Thus, there may be an increase in 
conflicting interests among those involved in the physical management of water. This type 
of involvement can prevent efficient problem-solving and increase the turmoil in local 
management bureaucracy; which in turn, could prevent effective management procedures 
at the local level. 
 
A growing body of literature shows how narrow, interest-based coalitions obstruct 
sustainable economic development and effective social adaptation to resource scarcity 
(Olson, 1982; Reed, 1992; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993; Ruttan, 1989). As water 
contamination and scarcity increase, and acceptable social adaptations fail to materialize, 
competition over water usage begins to develop among interest groups. As these narrow, 
interest-based coalitions pursue their own private interests, they often hinder the creation 
and implementation of broad-scale welfare programs aimed at improving institutional 
solutions for water resource problems. 
 
Mancur Olson’s (1982) work on the ability of different types of social coalitions to provide 
collective goods for their members offers critical insight into the nature of these coalitions. 
First, small groups generally organize more quickly and exert their interests more 
vigorously than larger groups. This provides small groups with greater relative political 
power and allows them to be more efficient in their lobbying efforts (e.g. flexible, focused 
and effective). Second, the ability to yield disproportionate power, relative to size, is 
especially evident in “unstable” societies (a phenomena which characterizes most poor 
nations) because larger coalitions take time and social stability to grow and mature. As a 
result, Olson argues that governments of unstable nation-states are “systematically 
influenced by the interests, pleas and pressures” of small coalitions (Olson, 1982; Homer-
Dixon, 1995). Third, and perhaps most importantly, small coalitions tend to pursue their 
own narrow self-interests, rather than the broader social interest; hence, their actions often 
hinder the establishment of institutions that might serve to benefit society at large. Because 
of this, narrow coalitions tend to be characterized as “distributional”, in that they seek to 
redistribute wealth rather than create it. 
 
Narrow interest-based coalitions clearly have the potential to intensify existing conflicts and 
complicate any risk management processes. The increasing participation of new actors in 
water policy and management decisions at all social scales (local, regional, national, 
transnational) will likely make it much easier for these narrow coalitions (at all social scales) 
to advance their interests in the risk management arena. 
 
Historically, social adaptations to water scarcity were determined and implemented by 
centralized government agencies. Until recently, donors presumed sovereignty of national 
governments by working with national legislatures on water issues and by providing 
economic assistance at the national level. Nation-states were perceived as sole sovereign 
powers and the sole potential recipients of donor aid for water investments (Ostrom, 1992). 
This increased and consolidated the power of central authorities over local authorities and 
the population in general. 
 
This view has changed significantly. In the past decade, there has been an increased 
participation of new actors in water policy and management decisions at all social scales 
(local, regional, national, transnational). This increased participation is the result of two 
factors. The first is an increased internal restlessness with the performance of central 
governments by local communities. This restlessness arises in response to the choice of the 
central government to ignore local needs of certain populations. This practice of the central 
government may be rooted in its inability to collect needed information that is accessible to 
local population, or in its insensitivity to the needs and interests of communities located 
away from influencing power. 
 
Thus, an increase in public participation also plays the role of voicing interests that were 
previously unheard under central government management of a water resource. An 
increase in public participation also results from the central government's choice to ignore 
local interests. So, from both aspects, an increase in public participation strengthens 
management efficiency and enhances social welfare. This, in turn, augments social adaptive 
capacity with regard to the water resource. An awareness of the needs that were ignored 
enables a central government to suggest compensation and other means of livelihood. In 
addition, this awareness also helps to decrease the social restlessness of population 
segments that may have felt deprived of their fair share in public goods offered by the state. 
 
2.3 Legal flexibility 
Risks associated with water may be augmented by complex legal situations that tie water 
rights to other aspects of property rights. One reason that a government may want to keep 
water-augmented occupations concerns legal land water attachments. The most obvious 
example is that of the total rejection of any water use agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Narrowly considering the water dispute between Israel and the 
Palestinians suggests that, since the water conflict between these two entities is actually a 
moderate income dispute (e.g., Zeitouni et al. 1994; Becker and Zeitouni, 1998), one entity 
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Viewed from this perspective, the evolution of water management practices involves 
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appropriate tools to meet the challenges posed. As policy makers seek different adaptation 
strategies, they often experience a perceived scarcity in the social means required to initiate 
policies for watershed management. Social tools are needed, so that the necessary policies 
required to control water crises are transformed into a driving force that can actively initiate 
changes in social perspective and power distribution. Managing this process involves 
learning how to deal with different types of conflicts - conflicts encountered as a result of the 
natural resource scarcity itself, as well as conflicts encountered as a result of inadequate 
strategies adopted to treat water demands and needs. 
 
However, the social perspective is not only about the needs related to the water resource. It 
is also the perspective of social power related to the utilization of such a resource. Social 
frictions over resource scarcity impede the supply of social ingenuity, particularly as regards 
the formation of new and reformed institutions, and contribute to the formation of social 
coalitions that oppose change (Homer-Dixon, 1995 and Olson, 1982). These coalitions often 
operate across multiple scales and may disrupt cooperation solutions for the 
commonwealth, as they pursue their own self interests. Thus, there may be an increase in 
conflicting interests among those involved in the physical management of water. This type 
of involvement can prevent efficient problem-solving and increase the turmoil in local 
management bureaucracy; which in turn, could prevent effective management procedures 
at the local level. 
 
A growing body of literature shows how narrow, interest-based coalitions obstruct 
sustainable economic development and effective social adaptation to resource scarcity 
(Olson, 1982; Reed, 1992; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993; Ruttan, 1989). As water 
contamination and scarcity increase, and acceptable social adaptations fail to materialize, 
competition over water usage begins to develop among interest groups. As these narrow, 
interest-based coalitions pursue their own private interests, they often hinder the creation 
and implementation of broad-scale welfare programs aimed at improving institutional 
solutions for water resource problems. 
 
Mancur Olson’s (1982) work on the ability of different types of social coalitions to provide 
collective goods for their members offers critical insight into the nature of these coalitions. 
First, small groups generally organize more quickly and exert their interests more 
vigorously than larger groups. This provides small groups with greater relative political 
power and allows them to be more efficient in their lobbying efforts (e.g. flexible, focused 
and effective). Second, the ability to yield disproportionate power, relative to size, is 
especially evident in “unstable” societies (a phenomena which characterizes most poor 
nations) because larger coalitions take time and social stability to grow and mature. As a 
result, Olson argues that governments of unstable nation-states are “systematically 
influenced by the interests, pleas and pressures” of small coalitions (Olson, 1982; Homer-
Dixon, 1995). Third, and perhaps most importantly, small coalitions tend to pursue their 
own narrow self-interests, rather than the broader social interest; hence, their actions often 
hinder the establishment of institutions that might serve to benefit society at large. Because 
of this, narrow coalitions tend to be characterized as “distributional”, in that they seek to 
redistribute wealth rather than create it. 
 
Narrow interest-based coalitions clearly have the potential to intensify existing conflicts and 
complicate any risk management processes. The increasing participation of new actors in 
water policy and management decisions at all social scales (local, regional, national, 
transnational) will likely make it much easier for these narrow coalitions (at all social scales) 
to advance their interests in the risk management arena. 
 
Historically, social adaptations to water scarcity were determined and implemented by 
centralized government agencies. Until recently, donors presumed sovereignty of national 
governments by working with national legislatures on water issues and by providing 
economic assistance at the national level. Nation-states were perceived as sole sovereign 
powers and the sole potential recipients of donor aid for water investments (Ostrom, 1992). 
This increased and consolidated the power of central authorities over local authorities and 
the population in general. 
 
This view has changed significantly. In the past decade, there has been an increased 
participation of new actors in water policy and management decisions at all social scales 
(local, regional, national, transnational). This increased participation is the result of two 
factors. The first is an increased internal restlessness with the performance of central 
governments by local communities. This restlessness arises in response to the choice of the 
central government to ignore local needs of certain populations. This practice of the central 
government may be rooted in its inability to collect needed information that is accessible to 
local population, or in its insensitivity to the needs and interests of communities located 
away from influencing power. 
 
Thus, an increase in public participation also plays the role of voicing interests that were 
previously unheard under central government management of a water resource. An 
increase in public participation also results from the central government's choice to ignore 
local interests. So, from both aspects, an increase in public participation strengthens 
management efficiency and enhances social welfare. This, in turn, augments social adaptive 
capacity with regard to the water resource. An awareness of the needs that were ignored 
enables a central government to suggest compensation and other means of livelihood. In 
addition, this awareness also helps to decrease the social restlessness of population 
segments that may have felt deprived of their fair share in public goods offered by the state. 
 
2.3 Legal flexibility 
Risks associated with water may be augmented by complex legal situations that tie water 
rights to other aspects of property rights. One reason that a government may want to keep 
water-augmented occupations concerns legal land water attachments. The most obvious 
example is that of the total rejection of any water use agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Narrowly considering the water dispute between Israel and the 
Palestinians suggests that, since the water conflict between these two entities is actually a 
moderate income dispute (e.g., Zeitouni et al. 1994; Becker and Zeitouni, 1998), one entity 
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should be able to compensate the other for shifting part of its agricultural sector to other 
fields of employment, thus preserving the income generation interests of this sector by way 
of a simple money transfer. As true as the economic concept of compensation may be, failing 
to acknowledge the fact that the legal link between plowing the land and its ownership that 
is originated back in the Ottoman era, led to under-representation of the opportunity cost of 
water as agricultural input. Under different legal ties between water and land ownership, 
the opportunity cost of giving away water may have been smaller. 
 
2.4 Economic constraints 
Reducing possible damage from water - associated risks may first and for most come from 
reducing unnecessary excessive use of water. This ability depends at large on the ability of 
societies and individuals within societies to adopt more efficient usage patterns. However, 
the opportunity cost of giving up part of the water from the very same river basin may vary 
widely between countries of different technological and economic adaptability. 
 
The reason for this is the different capability of nations regarding changes in employment 
opportunities. Nations with a social structure that allows for relatively easy mobility from 
water augmented occupations and livelihood into other occupations or employment 
opportunities incur smaller social costs for restructuring their use of water resources. Social 
stability is gained by using the water resource as a low-cost means to support employment 
in traditional ways, mainly through agriculture production. The cost of the water input may 
be lower to the user nation since, in the absence of agreed-upon international allocation, a 
bordering water body country can exploit the common pool’s externality of this resource. 
This external benefit enables the bordering nation to ignore the actual real cost of the water. 
 
In the short run, inefficient utilization of a water resource allows at least some of the 
involved parties to enjoy the external benefit, at the expense of other parties involved in this 
dispute. For these parties, these external benefits increase the cost of resolving the dispute. 
 
Industrialization and economic development may ease the pressure on water use as a 
primary input by providing the necessary (but not sufficient) augmentation of employment 
opportunities. Thus, in the modern arena, any discussion of risk adaptation must first 
acknowledge the notion that a possible course of action is not necessarily about matters of 
life and death for individuals (i.e., thirst), but rather a matter of social inflexibility that needs 
to be addressed in order to reduce the social opportunity costs of resolving the water 
conflict. 
 
2.5 International stakeholders 
Surface water and groundwater that cross international boundaries present significant 
challenges to regional stability because hydrologic needs can often be overwhelmed by 
political considerations. There are 261 rivers (Hammer, 1998) around the world, which cross 
the boundaries of two or more nations, and a large number of international groundwater 
aquifers. The basin areas that contribute to these rivers comprise approximately 47% of the 
earth’s land surface, and 40% of the world’s population, contributing to almost 60% of the 
freshwater flow (Wolf et al. 1999). With the continuous growth of world population and the 
diminishing water quality and quantity, water scarcity is increasing. As access to water is 
essential to the prosperity of communities, the threat of conflict over the use of 
transboundary water is also on the rise. 
Disputes over water seldom accelerate into an armed conflict. However, there are quite a 
few examples where water disputes have evolved into a real threat to such an open conflict. 
While many believe that water may be a source or cause of conflicts (Samson and Charrier, 
1997; Butts, 1997; Homer Dixon, 1994; Toset and Gleditsch, 2000), others are convinced there 
is strong evidence that nations are willing to find cooperative solutions for the use of 
transboundary water (Wolf, 1998; Salman and de Chazournes, 1998; Turton, 2000). 
 
In most cases, there are usually certain understandings and statutes that are maintained 
over time, even in the absence of an official agreement. However, often as a result of an 
absence in flexibility regarding the implementation of the agreement, the involved parties 
try, from time to time, to change the statutes. Some examples of this phenomenon presented 
themselves in the case of the Jordan River basin, where several incidents occurred in which 
Syria and Lebanon tried to divert the sources of the Jordan River. These incidents finally 
culminated in an extended period of tension, which continued to mount, almost leading to 
an armed conflict. This example indicates that, whenever possible, a flexible agreement 
should be clearly defined, and the penalties for each deviation should be clearly spelled out 
to all sides. 
 
Lowi (1995) discusses several agreements concerning the water allocation of the Jordan 
River and the Euphrates. In both cases, there is no official agreement for sharing the water 
and the resource is managed by some form of cooperation in order to meet the nations’ 
needs. Lowi (1995) addresses ways in which to improve the development and management 
of water-related international disputes without pre-agreed upon guidelines or rules 
regarding the management of conflicts among the nations involved. 
 
3. Risk management 
Risk management methodology was described in detail by Wideman (1992) to address possible 
risks associated with a given project. The methodology was then improved by the PMI, 
(2004), adding details based on users’ experience. As described by the PMI (2004), the main 
steps for any risk management plan are as follows: planning the risk assessment, identifying 
all risks, assessing the risks, writing a response plan and control plan and, throughout the 
duration of the project, continuously assessing the program’s risks. 
 
It is only a natural extension, then, to apply this methodology to the field of resource 
management, as was presented by Gonen and Zeitouni (2008) for the case of transboundary 
water resources. The difference between managing private projects and managing public 
resources lies in the nature of some of the risks, their evaluation, and the strategies that are 
available for mitigating them. 
 
3.1 Risk Assessment 
In general, threats are identified and then assessed according to their likelihood or 
probability to occur, and their realized conditional damage functions. Thus, expected 
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should be able to compensate the other for shifting part of its agricultural sector to other 
fields of employment, thus preserving the income generation interests of this sector by way 
of a simple money transfer. As true as the economic concept of compensation may be, failing 
to acknowledge the fact that the legal link between plowing the land and its ownership that 
is originated back in the Ottoman era, led to under-representation of the opportunity cost of 
water as agricultural input. Under different legal ties between water and land ownership, 
the opportunity cost of giving away water may have been smaller. 
 
2.4 Economic constraints 
Reducing possible damage from water - associated risks may first and for most come from 
reducing unnecessary excessive use of water. This ability depends at large on the ability of 
societies and individuals within societies to adopt more efficient usage patterns. However, 
the opportunity cost of giving up part of the water from the very same river basin may vary 
widely between countries of different technological and economic adaptability. 
 
The reason for this is the different capability of nations regarding changes in employment 
opportunities. Nations with a social structure that allows for relatively easy mobility from 
water augmented occupations and livelihood into other occupations or employment 
opportunities incur smaller social costs for restructuring their use of water resources. Social 
stability is gained by using the water resource as a low-cost means to support employment 
in traditional ways, mainly through agriculture production. The cost of the water input may 
be lower to the user nation since, in the absence of agreed-upon international allocation, a 
bordering water body country can exploit the common pool’s externality of this resource. 
This external benefit enables the bordering nation to ignore the actual real cost of the water. 
 
In the short run, inefficient utilization of a water resource allows at least some of the 
involved parties to enjoy the external benefit, at the expense of other parties involved in this 
dispute. For these parties, these external benefits increase the cost of resolving the dispute. 
 
Industrialization and economic development may ease the pressure on water use as a 
primary input by providing the necessary (but not sufficient) augmentation of employment 
opportunities. Thus, in the modern arena, any discussion of risk adaptation must first 
acknowledge the notion that a possible course of action is not necessarily about matters of 
life and death for individuals (i.e., thirst), but rather a matter of social inflexibility that needs 
to be addressed in order to reduce the social opportunity costs of resolving the water 
conflict. 
 
2.5 International stakeholders 
Surface water and groundwater that cross international boundaries present significant 
challenges to regional stability because hydrologic needs can often be overwhelmed by 
political considerations. There are 261 rivers (Hammer, 1998) around the world, which cross 
the boundaries of two or more nations, and a large number of international groundwater 
aquifers. The basin areas that contribute to these rivers comprise approximately 47% of the 
earth’s land surface, and 40% of the world’s population, contributing to almost 60% of the 
freshwater flow (Wolf et al. 1999). With the continuous growth of world population and the 
diminishing water quality and quantity, water scarcity is increasing. As access to water is 
essential to the prosperity of communities, the threat of conflict over the use of 
transboundary water is also on the rise. 
Disputes over water seldom accelerate into an armed conflict. However, there are quite a 
few examples where water disputes have evolved into a real threat to such an open conflict. 
While many believe that water may be a source or cause of conflicts (Samson and Charrier, 
1997; Butts, 1997; Homer Dixon, 1994; Toset and Gleditsch, 2000), others are convinced there 
is strong evidence that nations are willing to find cooperative solutions for the use of 
transboundary water (Wolf, 1998; Salman and de Chazournes, 1998; Turton, 2000). 
 
In most cases, there are usually certain understandings and statutes that are maintained 
over time, even in the absence of an official agreement. However, often as a result of an 
absence in flexibility regarding the implementation of the agreement, the involved parties 
try, from time to time, to change the statutes. Some examples of this phenomenon presented 
themselves in the case of the Jordan River basin, where several incidents occurred in which 
Syria and Lebanon tried to divert the sources of the Jordan River. These incidents finally 
culminated in an extended period of tension, which continued to mount, almost leading to 
an armed conflict. This example indicates that, whenever possible, a flexible agreement 
should be clearly defined, and the penalties for each deviation should be clearly spelled out 
to all sides. 
 
Lowi (1995) discusses several agreements concerning the water allocation of the Jordan 
River and the Euphrates. In both cases, there is no official agreement for sharing the water 
and the resource is managed by some form of cooperation in order to meet the nations’ 
needs. Lowi (1995) addresses ways in which to improve the development and management 
of water-related international disputes without pre-agreed upon guidelines or rules 
regarding the management of conflicts among the nations involved. 
 
3. Risk management 
Risk management methodology was described in detail by Wideman (1992) to address possible 
risks associated with a given project. The methodology was then improved by the PMI, 
(2004), adding details based on users’ experience. As described by the PMI (2004), the main 
steps for any risk management plan are as follows: planning the risk assessment, identifying 
all risks, assessing the risks, writing a response plan and control plan and, throughout the 
duration of the project, continuously assessing the program’s risks. 
 
It is only a natural extension, then, to apply this methodology to the field of resource 
management, as was presented by Gonen and Zeitouni (2008) for the case of transboundary 
water resources. The difference between managing private projects and managing public 
resources lies in the nature of some of the risks, their evaluation, and the strategies that are 
available for mitigating them. 
 
3.1 Risk Assessment 
In general, threats are identified and then assessed according to their likelihood or 
probability to occur, and their realized conditional damage functions. Thus, expected 
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damage is calculated as a reference measure in the decision about proper action. This 
approach enables the estimation of a risk budget when there is more than one risk. 
However, it is not very suitable for water resource management, since some of the damages 
are difficult to estimate, and the probability of their occurrence is even more complicated to 
estimate. In addition, the question of risk controllability is not readily answered. Most 
natural risks cannot be controlled; therefore, the possibility to propose a response plan is 
limited. In order to handle these types of risks, we suggest quantifying risks into three 
dimensions, instead of the two that are used today. The third dimension, which is 
introduced below for the measured risk, relates to its controllability. The controllability of a 
given risk reflects the ability to control it, mitigate it, or even prevent it. Assessing the 
controllability may reduce the efforts and the spending of managerial time and expenses on 
non-controllable risks and direct the attention of management only to controllable risks. 
 
In order to formulate this idea mathematically, let Ω be the set of all possible relevant risk 
events, Ω={α/ α is a risk event}. Let the damage function, D, be a function from Ω to R+, 
which satisfies the condition" that if α1 and α2 are two risks in Ω: 
 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( )D D for      (1) 
 
Then, for a given probability measure P that is defined on Ω, the expected damage E(D,P) 
can be calculated as the weighted  sum of damages at all phases,  E(D,P) = ∑ P(α)*D(α) . 
 
3.2 Evaluating the damage function 
Methods to attach a monetary value to the damage function may vary. It is, however, 
important to note that research has shown that the results of the use of valuation techniques 
can depend not only on the probability of an event’s occurrence, but also on the 
incorporation of the valued socio-economic effects into the decision making process. A Risk 
Assessment approach takes both dimensions into account. 
 
The influence of the probability of occurrence on the use of valuation techniques 
A very small probability of occurrence reduces the appropriateness of several valuation 
techniques. For example, land market traders appear unable to incorporate flood potential 
without some major flood to anchor their perceptions to. Hedonic estimates are sensitive to 
the market traders’ recent experience with a natural hazard. Hedonic estimates are either 
very large or zero, depending on the timing of the study vis-à-vis the latest flood (Shabman 
and Stephenson [1996]). Bartosova et al. [1999] show that when using the Hedonic Price 
Method, the detrimental effect of flood risk is eliminated after the expected flood risk falls to 
once every 33.33 years. Daun et al. [2000] confirmed the hypothesis that a household’s WTP 
for the maintenance of current levels of flood risk is positively related to flood risks as 
proxied by the household’s distance from the river. 
 
It can be concluded that the choice of valuation techniques determines, to some extent, the 
weight given to prescribed risks. The results of some techniques (such as Replacement/ 
Substitute costs) are unaffected by the probabilities itself. In contrast, other techniques (like 
the Hedonic Price Method) are highly affected by the probabilities. 
 
The Risk Assessment Approach 
The application of a valuation technique is only one issue that determines the way given 
threats are dealt with. Other characteristics of the decision making process may affect the 
assessment as well. Among them are: accounting for all possible damages, monetarizing 
them, selection and use of valuation methods, use of discount rate, accountability for non-
monetary values, presence of limiting conditions, and the risk attitude of decision-makers. 
 
When weighing up the costs and benefits of a decision regarding management of a given 
risk, the result will strongly depend on the effects that are taken into account. The choice 
between social or private costs and benefits will be largely determined by the social 
responsibility valuators take. The choice of effects to be monetarized will also be influenced 
by their risk attitude. 
 
The outcome of the use of a valuation technique is often used to calculate present values in 
the context of the damage function. This implies that weights are attached to effects of the 
specific risk in the future. Defining the appropriate discount rate is not straightforward and 
no firm conclusions can be drawn about which rate should be used. Economic theory does 
not impose a certain rate on the decision-maker; it is, rather, the opinion of the decision-
maker himself within his institutional context that determines the rate. 
 
The extent to which non-monetary effects are taken into account in the calculation of the 
damage function will also have its implications on how society deals with the risk. Limiting 
conditions can have an effect on both probabilities and possible damage. The timing when 
the assessment is carried out may be crucial in determining whether a given condition is 
limiting or not. For example, the consideration of a flood risk may lead to different 
recommendations regarding the risk handling, if it relates to the question of whether or not 
to go on with a housing project that is being built on a river bank, than when it relates to 
possible flood control after houses are already standing on the same river bank. Moreover, 
the attitude towards handling uncertainties regarding the outcome of each step in the 
process of damage function valuation (starting with the identification and selection of effects 
up to the application of valuation methods) may strongly steer if and how the valuation 
takes place. 
 
3.3 Response and controllability 
The sole consideration of expected damage is insufficient in the management of water 
resources, since not only are the damages and their respected probabilities difficult to 
estimate, but most natural risks cannot be controlled; therefore, the possibility to propose a 
response plan may be very limited. In order to handle these types of risks, it is suggested to 
define any given risk by its three-dimensional definition, instead of the two-dimensional 
definition that is used today. The third dimension is the controllability of the risk. 
 
For each risk event α, there is a set of possible responses Rα, such that  Rα ={β/ β is a response 
plan to event α}. A response is an operation that requires expenditure and changes the 
probability and/or the damage function. A response plan β for risk α can mathematically be 
defined as a triple (Cβ,P(α/β),D(α/β)) where: Cβ, is the cost of  response . P(α/β) is the 
probability of risk α , given that response β was applied. Note that a given response may be 
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damage is calculated as a reference measure in the decision about proper action. This 
approach enables the estimation of a risk budget when there is more than one risk. 
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are difficult to estimate, and the probability of their occurrence is even more complicated to 
estimate. In addition, the question of risk controllability is not readily answered. Most 
natural risks cannot be controlled; therefore, the possibility to propose a response plan is 
limited. In order to handle these types of risks, we suggest quantifying risks into three 
dimensions, instead of the two that are used today. The third dimension, which is 
introduced below for the measured risk, relates to its controllability. The controllability of a 
given risk reflects the ability to control it, mitigate it, or even prevent it. Assessing the 
controllability may reduce the efforts and the spending of managerial time and expenses on 
non-controllable risks and direct the attention of management only to controllable risks. 
 
In order to formulate this idea mathematically, let Ω be the set of all possible relevant risk 
events, Ω={α/ α is a risk event}. Let the damage function, D, be a function from Ω to R+, 
which satisfies the condition" that if α1 and α2 are two risks in Ω: 
 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( )D D for      (1) 
 
Then, for a given probability measure P that is defined on Ω, the expected damage E(D,P) 
can be calculated as the weighted  sum of damages at all phases,  E(D,P) = ∑ P(α)*D(α) . 
 
3.2 Evaluating the damage function 
Methods to attach a monetary value to the damage function may vary. It is, however, 
important to note that research has shown that the results of the use of valuation techniques 
can depend not only on the probability of an event’s occurrence, but also on the 
incorporation of the valued socio-economic effects into the decision making process. A Risk 
Assessment approach takes both dimensions into account. 
 
The influence of the probability of occurrence on the use of valuation techniques 
A very small probability of occurrence reduces the appropriateness of several valuation 
techniques. For example, land market traders appear unable to incorporate flood potential 
without some major flood to anchor their perceptions to. Hedonic estimates are sensitive to 
the market traders’ recent experience with a natural hazard. Hedonic estimates are either 
very large or zero, depending on the timing of the study vis-à-vis the latest flood (Shabman 
and Stephenson [1996]). Bartosova et al. [1999] show that when using the Hedonic Price 
Method, the detrimental effect of flood risk is eliminated after the expected flood risk falls to 
once every 33.33 years. Daun et al. [2000] confirmed the hypothesis that a household’s WTP 
for the maintenance of current levels of flood risk is positively related to flood risks as 
proxied by the household’s distance from the river. 
 
It can be concluded that the choice of valuation techniques determines, to some extent, the 
weight given to prescribed risks. The results of some techniques (such as Replacement/ 
Substitute costs) are unaffected by the probabilities itself. In contrast, other techniques (like 
the Hedonic Price Method) are highly affected by the probabilities. 
 
The Risk Assessment Approach 
The application of a valuation technique is only one issue that determines the way given 
threats are dealt with. Other characteristics of the decision making process may affect the 
assessment as well. Among them are: accounting for all possible damages, monetarizing 
them, selection and use of valuation methods, use of discount rate, accountability for non-
monetary values, presence of limiting conditions, and the risk attitude of decision-makers. 
 
When weighing up the costs and benefits of a decision regarding management of a given 
risk, the result will strongly depend on the effects that are taken into account. The choice 
between social or private costs and benefits will be largely determined by the social 
responsibility valuators take. The choice of effects to be monetarized will also be influenced 
by their risk attitude. 
 
The outcome of the use of a valuation technique is often used to calculate present values in 
the context of the damage function. This implies that weights are attached to effects of the 
specific risk in the future. Defining the appropriate discount rate is not straightforward and 
no firm conclusions can be drawn about which rate should be used. Economic theory does 
not impose a certain rate on the decision-maker; it is, rather, the opinion of the decision-
maker himself within his institutional context that determines the rate. 
 
The extent to which non-monetary effects are taken into account in the calculation of the 
damage function will also have its implications on how society deals with the risk. Limiting 
conditions can have an effect on both probabilities and possible damage. The timing when 
the assessment is carried out may be crucial in determining whether a given condition is 
limiting or not. For example, the consideration of a flood risk may lead to different 
recommendations regarding the risk handling, if it relates to the question of whether or not 
to go on with a housing project that is being built on a river bank, than when it relates to 
possible flood control after houses are already standing on the same river bank. Moreover, 
the attitude towards handling uncertainties regarding the outcome of each step in the 
process of damage function valuation (starting with the identification and selection of effects 
up to the application of valuation methods) may strongly steer if and how the valuation 
takes place. 
 
3.3 Response and controllability 
The sole consideration of expected damage is insufficient in the management of water 
resources, since not only are the damages and their respected probabilities difficult to 
estimate, but most natural risks cannot be controlled; therefore, the possibility to propose a 
response plan may be very limited. In order to handle these types of risks, it is suggested to 
define any given risk by its three-dimensional definition, instead of the two-dimensional 
definition that is used today. The third dimension is the controllability of the risk. 
 
For each risk event α, there is a set of possible responses Rα, such that  Rα ={β/ β is a response 
plan to event α}. A response is an operation that requires expenditure and changes the 
probability and/or the damage function. A response plan β for risk α can mathematically be 
defined as a triple (Cβ,P(α/β),D(α/β)) where: Cβ, is the cost of  response . P(α/β) is the 
probability of risk α , given that response β was applied. Note that a given response may be 
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directed towards lowering the probability of the risk occurrence or reducing the damage 
function or both. Let P(α/β) be the conditional probability of the risk, given that response  
was taken. P(/) equals P(α) when the response is aimed directly at the damage function 
itself and not at changing the probability of the risk. 
 
D(α/β) is the damage that may occur if risk α is realized, given that response β was applied. 
Let us define the social utility from response β as: 
 
 Uβ = P(α)*D(α) – (Cβ + P(α/β)*D(α/β)) = E(D()) – [E(D(/)) + C] (2) 
 
Uβ measures the difference between the expected cost without response β and the expected 
cost with it. If a response β is selected, its cost is Cβ and the expected damage changes to: 
P(α/β)*D(α/β). Therefore, if Uβ is positive for a given response β, then the response lowers the 
expected damage sufficiently to offset the cost of the response. If Uβ is negative, then the 
given response is too costly, relative to its effect on the expected damage. If for every 
possible response plan β - Uβ is negative, then the risk α is said to be uncontrollable. 
 
A positive U is necessary for a risk to be controllable, but it is often not sufficient. A risk α 
may have a profitable response plan, but the policy maker does not have an available 
budget that can be allocated for it. The set of all responses to risk α is: Rα ={β/ β is a response 
plan to event α}. The controllability measure is: 
 
 Bα=max{Uβ/βRα} (3) 
 
Thus, a positive B  indicates the capability of mitigating risk α. 
 
The following numerical example illustrates the use of the controllability concept. Consider 
the possibility of terrorists poisoning water resources over the next 10 years. The probability 
of such an event would depend on the country in which the resource is located, its enemies, 
its political situation, and the like. Let us assume that this probability is 0.01 % or Pα=0.0001. 
The realized damage depends on the type of poisoning, the capability to detect this 
poisoning, and the size of the water resource. Let us assume that there are no detection 
sensors and that the poisoning level is highly severe. Thus, the damage is estimated to be 
$10,000M. In this case, the expected value of the damage, E(D()), would be $1,000,000. 
 
There is a response plan β that includes installing a detection system for the cost of $0.5 M 
(Cβ=500,000), which has a 90% chance of detecting such an event. If this detection system is 
introduced, the expected damage would only be $100 M. Thus, the detection system 
indicates a conditional probability of damage, P(α/β)=Pα*0.1=10-410-1 = 10-5 and the value of 
the conditional damage function, D(α/β)=108. Hence, the social utility from this particular 
response is equal to: 
 
Uβ=1,000,000 – (500,000 + 10810-5) = 499,000. 
 
Since Uβ>0, we say that the risk is controllable. 
4. Evaluating threats for Israel water resources 
4.1 Background on the Israeli water system 
Israel’s water resources include the Sea of Galilee, some streams, three main underground 
aquifers, a few dams, and rain water that seeps into the underground aquifers or is pooled 
into above-ground reservoirs. In addition, the country exploits a considerable amount of 
effluents, sewage water that is cleaned and filtered by undergoing various types of 
treatments and water desalination. Table 1 presents the amount of water produced and 
consumed in Israel between 2000 and 2007. 
 
Sequence of dry years: Over the past several years, Israel has suffered from a sequence of 
drought years; less than 80% of the average precipitation coupled with unresponsive 
consumption has served to quite substantially reduce the reservoir levels, mainly in the Sea 
of Galilee, the biggest reservoir from which water is transported throughout the country 
from north to south. 
 
Distribution of Precipitation: Most of the precipitation is in the form of rain during the 
winter, with some rainy days in the spring and autumn. About six months of every year are 
dry and substantially hot. 
 
Evaporation: Evaporation can cause a big loss of fresh water and influence the balance 
between production and consumption. Since the big reservoirs are out in the open, 
evaporation becomes a major risk to the Israeli water system management (Alpert, 2008). 
 
Growing demand: The growth of demand for fresh water is due mainly to population 
growth. However, new technologies in industry and agriculture are being successfully 
developed in an attempt to conserve water.  
 
WATER PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (millions of cubic meters) 
PRODUCTION *2007 2006 2005 2000 
BY PRODUCER(2)     
TOTAL 2,199 1,996 2,063 1,996 
Mekorot Water Co.- total1 1,394 1,330 1,379 1,341 
Wells (3) 747 670 564 725 
Hamovil water carrier (Kinneret) 224 242 401 230 
Upper water 194 201 211 216 
Effluents (4) 229 217 203 170 
Other producers - total 682 666 684 655 
Wells 317 316 319 331 
Upper water 207 208 233 225 
Effluents 158 142 132 99 
                                                                 
1 Mekorot is the main water company in Israel. It is the main producer and supplier, as 
shown in the above table. 
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was taken. P(/) equals P(α) when the response is aimed directly at the damage function 
itself and not at changing the probability of the risk. 
 
D(α/β) is the damage that may occur if risk α is realized, given that response β was applied. 
Let us define the social utility from response β as: 
 
 Uβ = P(α)*D(α) – (Cβ + P(α/β)*D(α/β)) = E(D()) – [E(D(/)) + C] (2) 
 
Uβ measures the difference between the expected cost without response β and the expected 
cost with it. If a response β is selected, its cost is Cβ and the expected damage changes to: 
P(α/β)*D(α/β). Therefore, if Uβ is positive for a given response β, then the response lowers the 
expected damage sufficiently to offset the cost of the response. If Uβ is negative, then the 
given response is too costly, relative to its effect on the expected damage. If for every 
possible response plan β - Uβ is negative, then the risk α is said to be uncontrollable. 
 
A positive U is necessary for a risk to be controllable, but it is often not sufficient. A risk α 
may have a profitable response plan, but the policy maker does not have an available 
budget that can be allocated for it. The set of all responses to risk α is: Rα ={β/ β is a response 
plan to event α}. The controllability measure is: 
 
 Bα=max{Uβ/βRα} (3) 
 
Thus, a positive B  indicates the capability of mitigating risk α. 
 
The following numerical example illustrates the use of the controllability concept. Consider 
the possibility of terrorists poisoning water resources over the next 10 years. The probability 
of such an event would depend on the country in which the resource is located, its enemies, 
its political situation, and the like. Let us assume that this probability is 0.01 % or Pα=0.0001. 
The realized damage depends on the type of poisoning, the capability to detect this 
poisoning, and the size of the water resource. Let us assume that there are no detection 
sensors and that the poisoning level is highly severe. Thus, the damage is estimated to be 
$10,000M. In this case, the expected value of the damage, E(D()), would be $1,000,000. 
 
There is a response plan β that includes installing a detection system for the cost of $0.5 M 
(Cβ=500,000), which has a 90% chance of detecting such an event. If this detection system is 
introduced, the expected damage would only be $100 M. Thus, the detection system 
indicates a conditional probability of damage, P(α/β)=Pα*0.1=10-410-1 = 10-5 and the value of 
the conditional damage function, D(α/β)=108. Hence, the social utility from this particular 
response is equal to: 
 
Uβ=1,000,000 – (500,000 + 10810-5) = 499,000. 
 
Since Uβ>0, we say that the risk is controllable. 
4. Evaluating threats for Israel water resources 
4.1 Background on the Israeli water system 
Israel’s water resources include the Sea of Galilee, some streams, three main underground 
aquifers, a few dams, and rain water that seeps into the underground aquifers or is pooled 
into above-ground reservoirs. In addition, the country exploits a considerable amount of 
effluents, sewage water that is cleaned and filtered by undergoing various types of 
treatments and water desalination. Table 1 presents the amount of water produced and 
consumed in Israel between 2000 and 2007. 
 
Sequence of dry years: Over the past several years, Israel has suffered from a sequence of 
drought years; less than 80% of the average precipitation coupled with unresponsive 
consumption has served to quite substantially reduce the reservoir levels, mainly in the Sea 
of Galilee, the biggest reservoir from which water is transported throughout the country 
from north to south. 
 
Distribution of Precipitation: Most of the precipitation is in the form of rain during the 
winter, with some rainy days in the spring and autumn. About six months of every year are 
dry and substantially hot. 
 
Evaporation: Evaporation can cause a big loss of fresh water and influence the balance 
between production and consumption. Since the big reservoirs are out in the open, 
evaporation becomes a major risk to the Israeli water system management (Alpert, 2008). 
 
Growing demand: The growth of demand for fresh water is due mainly to population 
growth. However, new technologies in industry and agriculture are being successfully 
developed in an attempt to conserve water.  
 
WATER PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (millions of cubic meters) 
PRODUCTION *2007 2006 2005 2000 
BY PRODUCER(2)     
TOTAL 2,199 1,996 2,063 1,996 
Mekorot Water Co.- total1 1,394 1,330 1,379 1,341 
Wells (3) 747 670 564 725 
Hamovil water carrier (Kinneret) 224 242 401 230 
Upper water 194 201 211 216 
Effluents (4) 229 217 203 170 
Other producers - total 682 666 684 655 
Wells 317 316 319 331 
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1 Mekorot is the main water company in Israel. It is the main producer and supplier, as 
shown in the above table. 
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CONSUMPTION  
BY CONSUMER AND SUPPLIER(2)     
TOTAL 2,072 1,959 1,961 1,924 
Mekorot Water Co. 1,418 1,333 1,303 1,269 
Other suppliers (5) 654 626 658 655 
Agricultural 1,186 1,108 1,126 1,138 
Mekorot Water Co. 700 662 655 667 
Other suppliers 486 446 471 471 
Domestic and public 767 737 715 662 
Mekorot Water Co. 639 596 571 519 
Other suppliers 128 141 144 143 
Industrial 119 114 120 124 
Mekorot Water Co. 79 75 77 83 
 40 39 43 41 
Table 1. Main sources of water supplied and main water consumers in Israel 2000-2007 
(Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008; Water Authority). 
 
Water Quality: Despite limits placed on water withdrawal, the regime of natural water 
flows has decreased as a result of drought. At the same time, the influx of pollutants from 
human activity and negligence on the land over the aquifers is increasing, resulting in the 
increase of minerals, non-degradable, and other pollutants in the groundwater. Due to 
unbalanced exploitation and return flow from irrigation, an increase in the salinity of the 
groundwater has occurred in many wells. The re-use of sewage water and the infiltration of 
unused sewage add over 200,000 tons of salt to the aquifers every year. Moreover, they have 
also added nitrates, soluble organic materials, heavy metals and other chemicals, including 
carcinogenic ones. The coastal aquifer is contaminated by sea water, garbage dumps, 
sewage flow, uncontrolled field fertilizers and pesticides application, toxic industrial waste 
discharge, and fuel leaks. 
 
Part of the sewage that reaches the aquifer is not treated at all or only undergoes 
preliminary treatment before it enters the streams and sea. In addition, in many areas 
throughout the country, water lines are laid next to sewage pipes, thus causing leakages to 
the water system due to poor maintenance. A balance forecast of water in Israel, conducted 
by the World Bank in 1994, indicates an annual cumulative gap of 1 billion cubic meters by 
2020. 
 
International agreements: Part of Israel’s water sources are shared with Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Numerous incidents occurred between Israel, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon until a clear status-quo was determined. These clashes began in 1951 - 
when the countries established unilateral plans for the distribution of the water - and 
continued until the last military confrontation among the riparian in 1969, when Israel 
attacked Jordan's East Ghor Canal. Israel attacked Jordan's East Ghor Canal believing Jordan 
was partly responsible to some Palestinians attacks and retaliated by leading two raids 
against Jordan in June and August of 1969, destroying the new East Ghor Canal. Following 
the attack, the U.S. mediated negotiations between Israel and Jordan, which led to an 
agreement in 1970. Israel was convinced that the reduced flow of the Jordan was a natural 
occurrence, and Jordan agreed to follow the Johnston Plan and cease Palestine Liberation 
Organization activity on its territory. 
 
Another conflict for which there has been no solution as of yet concerns Israeli control of the 
West Bank aquifers since 1967. The 1967 nationalization of all the West Bank water resources 
by Israel increased the already existing tension over land issues between the Palestinians 
and Israelis. In the other part of the Palestinian Authority, Gaza, the quality of water in the 
groundwater aquifer is very low due to severe over-pumping. The coastal aquifer in this 
area has been almost completely destroyed; most of the damage is on the Palestinian side. 
Israelis and Palestinians will have to share water from the mountain aquifer, where there is 
a serious danger of salting, due to over-pumping and the use of untreated water for 
irrigation by the Palestinians. Israel controls and allows extraction of the Palestinian 
Authority over the mountain aquifer, according to the modification made in the Johnston 
Agreement to address water allocation to the Palestinian Authority. 
 
Governance 
The Israeli Water Authority is basically responsible for managing most of the water 
resources. Despite the existence of sufficient legislation regarding effective measures to 
prevent water pollution and encourage the purification and reuse of contaminated water, 
the water authority is not effective in enforcing this legislation. Beyond the problem of 
enforcement and deterrence against water polluting sources, there is no significant 
legislation regarding the utilization of water resources. 
 
The last inclusive master plan for managing water resources was prepared in 1988. This plan 
included proposed sizes of desalination facilities, regardless of some contradicting economic 
considerations. The implementation of the plan was at most partial. Several rainy years and 
the high cost of implementation caused the government to postpone large parts of the plan; 
in particular, construction of several desalination facilities as the condition for establishing 
the desalination facilities was a government commitment to purchase large quantities of 
desalinated water, which is currently considered by the government to be too costly and 
inefficient. 
 
Another responsibility of the water authority is the security of the water supply. Among the 
security issues, terrorism is ranked as one of the eminent risk factors. The Water Authority 
makes a fairly big and successful effort to secure water facilities and diminish the likelihood 
of damage from any possible terrorist attack. There is also a backup and repair plan, in the 
event of any possible damage to the water facility. An automatic monitoring system, which 
operates throughout the national water carrier and in most existing reservoirs, is designed 
to detect any possible damage. In addition, natural sensors, such as fish and bacteria, are 
placed at important intersections and are monitored constantly to detect any possible 
change in their reaction to the environment. 
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CONSUMPTION  
BY CONSUMER AND SUPPLIER(2)     
TOTAL 2,072 1,959 1,961 1,924 
Mekorot Water Co. 1,418 1,333 1,303 1,269 
Other suppliers (5) 654 626 658 655 
Agricultural 1,186 1,108 1,126 1,138 
Mekorot Water Co. 700 662 655 667 
Other suppliers 486 446 471 471 
Domestic and public 767 737 715 662 
Mekorot Water Co. 639 596 571 519 
Other suppliers 128 141 144 143 
Industrial 119 114 120 124 
Mekorot Water Co. 79 75 77 83 
 40 39 43 41 
Table 1. Main sources of water supplied and main water consumers in Israel 2000-2007 
(Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008; Water Authority). 
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Authority over the mountain aquifer, according to the modification made in the Johnston 
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Governance 
The Israeli Water Authority is basically responsible for managing most of the water 
resources. Despite the existence of sufficient legislation regarding effective measures to 
prevent water pollution and encourage the purification and reuse of contaminated water, 
the water authority is not effective in enforcing this legislation. Beyond the problem of 
enforcement and deterrence against water polluting sources, there is no significant 
legislation regarding the utilization of water resources. 
 
The last inclusive master plan for managing water resources was prepared in 1988. This plan 
included proposed sizes of desalination facilities, regardless of some contradicting economic 
considerations. The implementation of the plan was at most partial. Several rainy years and 
the high cost of implementation caused the government to postpone large parts of the plan; 
in particular, construction of several desalination facilities as the condition for establishing 
the desalination facilities was a government commitment to purchase large quantities of 
desalinated water, which is currently considered by the government to be too costly and 
inefficient. 
 
Another responsibility of the water authority is the security of the water supply. Among the 
security issues, terrorism is ranked as one of the eminent risk factors. The Water Authority 
makes a fairly big and successful effort to secure water facilities and diminish the likelihood 
of damage from any possible terrorist attack. There is also a backup and repair plan, in the 
event of any possible damage to the water facility. An automatic monitoring system, which 
operates throughout the national water carrier and in most existing reservoirs, is designed 
to detect any possible damage. In addition, natural sensors, such as fish and bacteria, are 
placed at important intersections and are monitored constantly to detect any possible 
change in their reaction to the environment. 
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4.2 Identifying the risks 
The first step in risk management is the identification of possible risks. This task requires 
information from experts in the field. For this study, interviews with experts in various 
fields related to water management in Israel were conducted, in order to identify the specific 
risks that are relevant to Israel. The major identified risks are presented in Table 2. 
 
 Risk Description Category 
1 Drought Sequence of dry years with low 
precipitation  
Natural causes 
2 Earthquakes Powerful earthquakes that severely 
damage the water and sewage systems 
Natural causes 
3 Local Terrorism - 
Sabotage 
Damaging/destroying the pumping 
facilities or major pipe lines 
Water Security 
4 Local terrorism - 
Poisoning 
Poisoning reservoirs Water Security 
5 Reservoir 
evaporation 
Increase in temperature, causing a rapid 
evaporation of exposed water reservoirs 
Natural causes 
6 Agricultural 
pollution 
Seepage of chemicals and fertilizers into 
groundwater 
Management 
policy 
7 Preventing water 
seepage 
Construction and development prevent 
water seepage into the aquifers 
Management 
policy 
8 Diversion of 
transboundary 
water resources 
Diverting transboundary water 
resources without an agreement can 
cause confrontations that might end in 
war 
Geopolitics 
9 Climate changes Climate changes can raise the sea level 
and cause the transfer of seawater into 
the coastal aquifer. It can change the rain 
distribution and the rainy season. 
Natural causes 
10 Changes in the 
distribution of 
rain 
Changes in the rain distribution that 
cause more rainy days and extreme 
floods 
Natural causes 
11 Over-pumping 
the mountain 
aquifer 
Lack of coordination in water usage may 
cause over-pumping of mountain 
aquifer, which leads to increased salting 
of water resources 
Geopolitics 
12 Industrial 
pollution 
Flow of industry waste, seepage of 
chemicals - without sufficient 
enforcement 
Management 
policy 
13 Commitment to 
supply Jordan 
Shortages as a result of political 
commitments for water supply to 
neighboring countries, such as Jordan 
Geopolitics 
14 Political 
involvement in 
decision making 
Too much political involvement, which 
disrupts the master plan development 
Management 
policy 
15 Disregard  of 
facilities 
Disregard of pumping facilities, 
pipelines and other components of the 
water system, due to budget constraints 
Management 
policy 
16 Inadequate 
legislation and 
enforcement 
Inadequate legislation and enforcement 
allow excessive quotas, and uncontrolled 
pollution of water 
Management 
policy 
17 Increase in 
demand 
Increase in demand, due to population 
and production technology 
Management 
policy 
18 Irrigation by 
effluents 
Groundwater pollution, due to irrigation 
by low quality effluents 
Environmental 
factors 
19 Groundwater 
pollution by 
garbage, oil, etc. 
Embolic garbage or oil that penetrates 
and pollutes the groundwater 
Environmental 
factors 
20 Environmental 
damage to "Sea 
Canal" 
The “Sea Canal” is a project that aims to 
add sea water to the Dead Sea, either 
from the Mediterranean or the Red Sea. 
This is both an opportunity and an 
ecological risk to wells 
Geopolitics + 
environmental 
factors 
21 Incompatible 
utilization of 
Jordan or 
Yarmouk rivers 
Keeping water agreements on both sides 
of the border is essential. Since the water 
agreements are sensitive to the 
geopolitical situation, one side may 
break the agreement, causing 
deterioration that could lead to a war in 
the area 
Geopolitics 
22 Development 
suspension 
resulting from 
geopolitical 
reasons 
The possibility that one day Israel will 
transfer part of the lands in a peace 
agreement prevents a certain amount of 
system development 
Geopolitics 
23 Governance crisis Management failures, due to political 
constraints, agreements and wrong 
decisions 
Management 
Policy 
Table 2. Identified risks in the water arena 
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4.3 Quantitative analysis of the risks 
Rating the urgency and severity of risks is the second step in the risk-ranking process. To 
rate the risks that are presented in Table 2, questionnaires were distributed to professionals 
from government, academia and the industry, who are involved in the water arena in Israel. 
The questionnaires requested the rating of three measures for each risk: probability of 
occurrence, impact level of the risk, and controllability. The risk probability was measured by a 
Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Highly unlikely event) to 5 (very likely event): As for the 
damage function, although ideally it would have been optimal to estimate the damage 
function for each risk, making such estimations is a costly and time-consuming effort. Given 
the budget limitation for this project, only ranking was required. Impact level and 
Controllability were scaled between 1 and 5. The measures for controllability were ranked 
as follows: 
5 - The risk is not controllable. 
4 – The risk is difficult and expensive to control. 
3 - The risk is partially controlled. 
2 – The risk is controllable. 
1 - The risk is easy to control. 
Next, the Borda Rank (Engert, Lansdowne, 1999) was calculated. The results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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4 – The risk is difficult and expensive to control. 
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In Table 3, the three aspects associated with any risk - the probability, the impact and the 
controllability - were derived from experts' assessments, after which rounded averages of 
these assessments were calculated. Then, the Borda Rank was calculated for each factor, 
(presented in columns P-rank for probability, I-rank for impact and C-rank for controllability). 
In order to explain the Borda Rank, a demonstration may be useful. Consider the P-rank 
column. There are 10 risks, whose probability is ranked 5 (very high). They are ordered from 
1 to 10 with average of 5.5. Therefore, these 10 risks are assigned a P-rank of 5.5. There are 3 
risks that are given a rank of 4 (high probability of occurrence). Therefore, they are ordered 
11, 12, and 13 and their average order is 12. These 3 risks are assigned a P-rank of 12. The 
same procedure is iterated for the 2 risks whose probability was ranked as 3. They are given 
the order 14 and 15 and their assigned P-rank is 14.5. In the same manner, risks at 
probability group 2 are assigned a P-rank of 17.5. The last group, probability 1, is assigned a 
P-rank of 21.5. The same calculations are applied for the I-rank. 
The C-rank is calculated in reverse order. Contrary to the impact and probability ranking, 
controllability’s high rank implies a lower priority. Thus, low rank should increase its 
priority of response. Therefore, the 3 risks with a controllability rank of 1 are assigned as 
order 2 in the C-rank, while the most non-controllable risks, ranked at controllability 5, are 
assigned a C-rank of 22. 
 
The sum of the P-rank and I-rank is displayed in the column named "Total P&I Ranks". This 
column is ranked into the column named "Final Rank of P&I". The meaning of this rank is 
that the lowest value should be handled with high priority, e.g. risk number 11 - “over-
pumping the mountain aquifer" - which has a very high probability of occurring and high 
impact and damage rankings - should be handled first. The ranking is calculated using "Risk 
Matrix" software (Engert, Lansdowne, 1999). The column "Final Rank of P&I" provides the 
priorities of handling risks based on their probability and impact. It is presented such that 
the lowest ranks should be handled with high priority. 
All three ranks - P-rank, I-rank and C-rank - are summed in the column named "Total 
P&I&C Ranks". This column is ranked into the column named "Final Rank of P&I&C", 
which is a measure that acknowledges all three risk criteria - probability, impact and 
controllability. The final rank is actually in reverse order (the lower the final rank, the higher 
its priority). 
 
4.5 Results Analysis 
Table 3 indicates that although in this case the addition of the C-rank did not alter the order 
of risks substantially, the result is that it eliminated uncontrollable risks that have high 
priority and enable the handling of other risks with higher potential benefit. Figure 1 shows 
the two final ranks, after sorting the list of risks. The risks were ordered (sorted) by their 
P&I&C ranks. 
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In Table 3, the three aspects associated with any risk - the probability, the impact and the 
controllability - were derived from experts' assessments, after which rounded averages of 
these assessments were calculated. Then, the Borda Rank was calculated for each factor, 
(presented in columns P-rank for probability, I-rank for impact and C-rank for controllability). 
In order to explain the Borda Rank, a demonstration may be useful. Consider the P-rank 
column. There are 10 risks, whose probability is ranked 5 (very high). They are ordered from 
1 to 10 with average of 5.5. Therefore, these 10 risks are assigned a P-rank of 5.5. There are 3 
risks that are given a rank of 4 (high probability of occurrence). Therefore, they are ordered 
11, 12, and 13 and their average order is 12. These 3 risks are assigned a P-rank of 12. The 
same procedure is iterated for the 2 risks whose probability was ranked as 3. They are given 
the order 14 and 15 and their assigned P-rank is 14.5. In the same manner, risks at 
probability group 2 are assigned a P-rank of 17.5. The last group, probability 1, is assigned a 
P-rank of 21.5. The same calculations are applied for the I-rank. 
The C-rank is calculated in reverse order. Contrary to the impact and probability ranking, 
controllability’s high rank implies a lower priority. Thus, low rank should increase its 
priority of response. Therefore, the 3 risks with a controllability rank of 1 are assigned as 
order 2 in the C-rank, while the most non-controllable risks, ranked at controllability 5, are 
assigned a C-rank of 22. 
 
The sum of the P-rank and I-rank is displayed in the column named "Total P&I Ranks". This 
column is ranked into the column named "Final Rank of P&I". The meaning of this rank is 
that the lowest value should be handled with high priority, e.g. risk number 11 - “over-
pumping the mountain aquifer" - which has a very high probability of occurring and high 
impact and damage rankings - should be handled first. The ranking is calculated using "Risk 
Matrix" software (Engert, Lansdowne, 1999). The column "Final Rank of P&I" provides the 
priorities of handling risks based on their probability and impact. It is presented such that 
the lowest ranks should be handled with high priority. 
All three ranks - P-rank, I-rank and C-rank - are summed in the column named "Total 
P&I&C Ranks". This column is ranked into the column named "Final Rank of P&I&C", 
which is a measure that acknowledges all three risk criteria - probability, impact and 
controllability. The final rank is actually in reverse order (the lower the final rank, the higher 
its priority). 
 
4.5 Results Analysis 
Table 3 indicates that although in this case the addition of the C-rank did not alter the order 
of risks substantially, the result is that it eliminated uncontrollable risks that have high 
priority and enable the handling of other risks with higher potential benefit. Figure 1 shows 
the two final ranks, after sorting the list of risks. The risks were ordered (sorted) by their 
P&I&C ranks. 
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 Fig. 1. Final Ranks of all the risks 
 
The figure shows that most risks follow the same trend. Namely, risks with high priority, 
according to the final P&I rank, will have a high priority, according to the final P&I&C rank, 
and vice versa. The risk with the lowest rank is "over-pumping the mountain aquifer" (see 
Table 3). This risk has a high probability, since this aquifer is utilized by both the Israeli and 
the Palestinians; this risk also has a high impact and is controllable within the framework of 
the existing legal situation (even though the laws are not currently enforced). According to 
the P&I rank, the second risk to be handled is drought. Drought is not among the top 10 
risks, according to the P&I&C rank, since it is hardly controllable. Hence, the only thing that 
the government does regarding this risk is to insure farmers for crop losses. 
 
In Table 3, classifying the risks into categories (natural causes, geopolitics, management 
policy, water security, and environmental factors) is helpful in analyzing groups of risks, 
instead of individual risks. The difference between the P&I rank and the P&I&C rank, may 
be better understood by a comparison of the average of these ranks over each risk category. 
The difference between the two ranks is shown in Figure 2. For each category of risks, the 
average of the P&I rank and the P&I&C rank value is presented. In addition, the number of 
risks in each category is added to the category name. 
 
It can be seen that the addition of controllability decreased the average rank of the "natural 
caused" category and increased all the other categories. This is because according to the 
expert opinion, risks derived from natural causes are mostly non-controllable; therefore, it is 
less effective to develop any response plan for them. In this case, although the average P&I 
rank is high, these risks' priority is reduced. On the other hand, the priorities among the 
other groups remain the same, where the groups of environmental factors and management 
policy risks have the lowest average ranks, and thus should be addressed first. 
 
 Fig. 2. Average ranks of all the categories risks 
 
4.6 The most threatening risks 
According the P&I&C rank of the risks, as presented in Table 3, the most threatening risks 
are: "Lack of coordination in water usage", "Disregard of facilities", "Political involvement in 
decision making", "Inadequate legislation and enforcement", and "Groundwater pollution 
by garbage, oil, etc." The first risk is a very common geopolitical problem, but its impact has 
not yet been fully understood. The other risks can be resolved by management policies and 
law enforcement. Risks like drought or earthquakes do not appear in the high priority part 
of the table, due to their lack of controllability and low probably of occurrence 
(earthquakes). 
 
It is interesting to note that most of the natural risks, such as earthquakes, climate changes, 
changes in the distribution of rainfall, and reservoir evaporation are located in the low 
priority part of the table. This is mainly due to a lack of controllability and either low 
probability or low impact. The controllability criteria assigned them a more realistic priority. 
It should be mentioned that the experts contacted in this research claimed that these are 
very important risks that should be handled carefully. However, they could not provide a 
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solution for addressing the issues concerning these risks. The incorporation of the 
controllability criterion captures this dichotomy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Efficient and flexible management of fresh water resources are critical for the wellbeing of 
human society. Without it, human society would be unable to prosper or even exist. 
Conflicting demands coupled with decreasing usable water may lead to inefficient and 
unsustainable use of resources, which may result in significant economic, social, and 
environmental ramifications. In the current work, risk management methodology is utilized 
to increase flexibility and security over the management of water resources. 
 
Since by their very nature many water resources are often associated with risks that are not 
readily controllable, a modification of the standard risk management methodology was 
adopted. This modification allows the accounting for the ability or inability to control the 
risk under consideration at an early stage of the planning. The controllability of the risk is 
incorporated among the risk identification parameters in order to avoid dealing with risks 
that are a priori non-controllable. 
 
The risk management of any water resource must address two large systems: the natural 
ecological system and the human societies that utilize the resource. Thus, it follows that the 
risks involved in the maintenance of water systems also involve both natural risks, as well 
as risks associated with the ways in which societies utilize the water and the values which 
humans attribute to it. Furthermore, the social values, beliefs and arrangements involved in 
the utilization of any fresh water resource serve to expand potential adaptation strategies, 
on one hand, while presenting challenges and social constraints regarding possible risk 
mitigation strategies by the other hand. They are restricted to the society’s ability to employ 
different means of adaptation over time, at different stages of risk management, and in 
response to different perceptions about what constitutes the challenges that must be met. 
 
To better illustrate the approach, a study on the risks associated with the management of 
water resources in Israel is presented. In order to understand the possible risks and their 
magnitude, experts' opinions were solicited. It turned out that the risks can be classified into 
five main groups: natural causes, geopolitics, management policy, water security, and 
environmental factors. Incorporating the controllability criterion into the risk assessment 
decreases the importance of the environmental risks, since according to the experts' opinions 
these are difficult or impossible to control. These natural risks are the most common risks 
for water resource management. Usually, these risks do not appear in the classical projects' 
risk analyses. Having a sizable natural environmental aspect, water systems are more 
susceptible to natural risks than commercial projects. The introduction of controllability 
criterion enables the government to identify and focus on responding to the most 
threatening risks requiring attention and action. Some of the risks that were initially 
assumed to be high risks are those of sabotage and terror attacks. These risks, however, 
were actually found to have a low impact and may be controlled in a relatively easy manner. 
Unlike environmental risks, risks of pollution and geopolitical risks can be controlled; 
therefore, their rank was enhanced by the introduction of the controllability criterion. 
This chapter demonstrates the incorporation of the controllability criterion at the assessment 
stage of risk management. Future studies conducted in other settings should further explore 
the effectiveness and usefulness of this modification - for risk management of water 
resources in particular - and for any other type of project management in general. 
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